In this paper we analyze a long-term risk-sharing contract between two risk-averse agents facing self-enforcing constraints. We enlarge the contracting space to allow for an ex ante transfer (at the beginning of the period) before the state of nature is realized. We analyze the trade-off between the self-enforcing constraints of the two agents by characterizing the optimal ex ante and ex post transfer payments. We show that optimal ex ante payments are non-stationary. They optimally depend on the surplus from the relationship each agent expects. The size of the ex ante payment an agent makes is inversely related to its expected surplus from the relationship. The introduction of ex ante payments generates interesting dynamic properties. In a two-state example with i.i.d. shocks, the dynamics of the optimal contract exhibit "experience rating" even though there is no private information or learning taking place.
Introduction
Long-term contracts are useful for the governance of long-term relationships. Such contracts can help improve incentives as well as risk-sharing between two agents. An optimal contract trades o between incentives and risk-sharing to attain an e cient allocation; however this e cient allocation is often time inconsistent. For example, an ex ante e cient allocation may not be ex post e cient once certain actions have been undertaken or some information has been revealed. This type of time-consistency problems has led to the recent literature on renegotiation. Or, an ex ante pro table contract may not be ex post pro table following a given history. In this case, if enforcement costs are high or mobility costs are low, agents may be tempted to renege on the contract to seek more pro table opportunities elsewhere. The literature on self-enforcing contracts studies this type of time-consistency problems.
This paper studies a dynamic risk-sharing relationship in which agents have commitment problems. Consider two agents that enter into a long-run relationship to share risk and for which enforcement costs are high. The risk-sharing problem analyzed in the literature usually has the following structure. 1 In every period a risk-averse agent receives a stochastic endowment. Risk-sharing is implemented by a contract specifying transfer payments between the two agents. These transfers take place at the end of the period once the state of nature has been observed. If the two agents can commit not to default on any prescribed transfer payment then the optimal contract achieves an e cient risk-sharing allocation; however, if an agent cannot commit not to default, e cient risk sharing may be impeded as the optimal contract is constrained by the possibility of ex post default. The contract should then prescribe payments that are self-enforcing, that is, payments that satisfy, for any realization of the state of nature and every period, a participation constraint for each agent. In any period the surplus one agent expects from the relationship conditions the transfer that it is willing to make in this period. An agent that expects a high surplus in the future has low incentives to break the relationship. It is therefore willing to make a high payment t o continue the relationship. On the other hand a low expected surplus yields low incentives to maintain the relationship. The agent m ust then be induced to remain in the relationship by making a low possibly negative payment. Self-enforcing constraints generally limit transfer payments and therefore reduce the opportunity for e cient risk sharing.
In this paper we show that allowing for a more general contracting space may help 1 For example, see Thomas and Worrall 1988. relaxing self-enforcing constraints. Suppose that these constraints are quite stringent for one agent, say agent 1. This e ectively limits the payments agent 1 can make to agent 2 . In this case, agent 1 w ould like to make a transfer to agent 2 b efore the state of nature is realized. At this point, agent 1's self-enforcing constraints only have to hold in expectation over all states of nature. Such e x a n te transfer would e ectively relax agent 1's ex post self-enforcing constraints by reducing its ex post payments. However when the two agents face self-enforcing constraints, an ex ante payment made by one agent to relax its own self-enforcing constraints usually makes the other agent's self-enforcing constraints more stringent b y leaving the ex post burden to that agent to make the necessary transfers for optimal risk-sharing. Consequently, the ex ante payment m ust trade o between the selfenforcing constraints of the two agents. We analyze the details of this trade-o in an optimal risk-sharing contract.
Our main results are that optimal ex ante payments are non-stationary. They depend on the surplus from the relationship each agent expects. This expected surplus evolves with the history of past realizations of states of nature. When an agent expects a low share of the surplus its ex post self-enforcing constraints are relatively stringent and it cannot be required to make a high ex post payment. In this case, the contract optimally requires that agent t o p a y an amount up front before the realization of the state of nature. This e ectively relaxes its ex post self-enforcing constraints. In general, however, these constraints cannot be completely eliminated because a high ex ante payment b y one agent increases the incentives of the other agent to break the relationship and run away with this payment. We show that the size of the ex ante payment an agent makes is inversely related to the surplus it expects to get from the relationship. We can also show that interesting dynamic properties emerge from our model even though shocks are independently and identically distributed across periods. For example, in a two-state example, we show that the dynamics of the optimal contract exhibit experience rating" even though there is no private information or learning taking place.
Section 2 presents the basic model. In Section 3 we analyze the role of ex ante payments when only one agent faces self-enforcing constraints. Section 4 presents the main results of the paper when the two agents face self-enforcing constraints. Section 5 discusses some key assumptions about the economic environment. A conclusion follows.
The model
The environment w e consider can be described by an in nite sequence of periods, t = 1; 2; :::; 1, and for each period, a nite set of states of nature, s 2 f 1 ; 2 ; :::; Sg, with S 2.
We assume that states are distributed independently and identically across all periods, and therefore, in each period, the state of nature s occurs with probability p s where P S s=1 p s = 1 . It is assumed that each period t is divided into three dates, t 0 ; t 1 , and t 2 , where t 1 is the date at which the state of nature is realized; the dates t 0 and t 2 denote respectively the dates preceding and following the realization of the state of nature.
Two in nitely-lived agents evolve in this environment. Both agents are risk averse. In each period, agent 1's preferences over consumption c are represented by uc where u is a state-independent increasing and strictly concave utility function for c 2 0; b . In each period, agent 1 obtains a state-contingent endowment y s . We adopt the convention that y s y s , 1 for all states s. W e assume that 0 y 1 y S b . This endowment is observable to agent 2 . 2 In each period, agent 2's preferences over consumption c are given by vc where v is also a state-independent increasing and strictly concave function for c 2 0; b . In each period, agent 2 obtains a state-independent endowment e. 3 To insure an interior solution we assume that y S + e b and that u 0 0 = 1, v 0 0 = 1. Both agents discount the future by a common factor 2 0; 1.
We assume that there are no contingent markets that would allow the agents to diversify their risk and therefore the two agents enter into a risk-sharing relationship. For example, the reader can think of agent 1 as an insuree and agent 2 as an insuror. We call the governance of such relationship a contract where the term contract" is interpreted in a broad sense, namely it can encompass implicit as well as explicit agreements. A contract then speci es various transfers between the two agents for all periods of the relationship. In each period t, a contract can specify the following structure of transfer payments. technology to legally enforce the prescribed payments. The objective of the paper is to study the e ects of limited enforceability o f p a yments on optimal contracts. We rst establish a benchmark case in which the two agents sign a contract at the beginning of the rst period and all prescribed transfers are legally enforceable. We refer to this case as the full-commitment case. In this case, the optimal contract, f c , is the solution to the following maximization problem where, for simplicity, it is assumed that agent 1 has the bargaining power and agent 2's reservation utility is given by autarky. This maximization problem simply states that the optimal contract maximizes the discounted expected utility of agent 1 subject to agent 2's participation constraint. This constraint states that the contract must provide agent 2 with a nonnegative discounted expected surplus. A solution to this maximization problem exists and is characterized in the following proposition. 5 Proposition 1 When both agents can commit to the terms of the contract, the optimal contract, f c , is characterized by the equalization of marginal rates of substitution of consumption of the two agents across all states and periods. Two aspects of this characterization deserve mention. First, in problem 1, the functions U and V depend only on the net transfers B t , a s t and therefore, in each state only optimal net transfers are determined. This implies that the optimal value of B t is arbitrary. With full commitment there is no role for the ex ante transfer B t in the optimal contract. Second, in some states of nature net transfers from agent 1 to agent 2 are positive, and in other states the opposite is true. Complete legal enforcement of the contract is a su cient condition to make these transfers feasible. In the next sections we relax the assumption of complete legal enforcement to study the characterization of optimal contracts under incomplete legal enforcement.
3 Contracting under one-sided commitment In this section we consider an environment in which legal enforcement of all prescribed payments is limited. We examine the situation in which only agent 1 cannot commit to making all transfers prescribed by the contract. 6 We s a y that agent 1 faces self-enforcing constraints. These constraints impose that, at any point in time, agent 1 should always do at least as well obeying the contract as reneging on it. When the self-enforcing constraints are satis ed we s a y that the contract is self-enforcing.
When legal enforcement cannot provide a su cient incentive for agent 1 to obey the contract it must be incited to do so di erently. In a long-term relationship such incentive arises endogenously from the interaction of the two agents over time. One approach to study this incentive w ould be to model the relationship as a strategic game where each agent's strategy would be a sequence of payments for the complete history and following any history. In this case, the incentive for agent 1 to obey its equilibrium strategy would come from the anticipation of agent 2's response to a deviation. Any p a yment b y agent 1 w ould therefore be enforced by the strategy of player 2. The more severe would be player 2's punishment, the higher would be cooperation between the two agents. In this case the Folk theorem states that given a high enough discount factor any individually rational feasible allocation can be sustained in equilibrium. For our purposes such an approach is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, as is well known in the theory of supergames the multiplicity of equilibria creates signi cant coordination problems between the two agents. Second, we are interested here in characterizing allocations for any v alue of the discount factor and not just allocations for high values of the discount factor.
We therefore adopt the following approach. We assume that if agent 1 reneges on the contract it su ers the maximal punishment in that it must remain in autarky forever after. This punishment strategy by agent 2 allows us to characterize the best possible contract satisfying self-enforcing constraints. 7 The optimal contract is then the solution to a well-de ned 6 The analysis of the opposite case in which only agent 2 can renege on the contract is symmetric. 7 In a labour market example MacLeod and Malcomson 1989 model a situation similar to ours as an explicit game and show that the maximal punishment is indeed subgame perfect. Any deviating agent i s punished in the future by not being able to enter a successful relationship, all parties expecting the deviating agent to deviate again in the future. Furthermore, Kocherlakota 1994 shows that this maximal punishment is renegotiation-proof if it is interpreted as maintaining the contract but reverting to the point on the Pareto frontier that the deviating agent likes the least. maximization problem. This approach resolves the coordination problem in e ectively coordinating the two agents on a Pareto e cient allocation. Furthermore it allows us to characterize optimal allocations for any v alue of the discount factor. Agent 1 will make a transfer to agent 2 if and only if it is in its interest to do so. Agent 1 will compare the bene t of making the transfer and obeying the contract with the payo of reneging on the contract and staying in autarky thereafter. For example, suppose the two agents have signed a contract prescribing transfers fB t h t,1 ; A t h t g for all histories h t . I n period t agent 1 m a y decide to renege on the contract at date t 0 before receiving the possibly negative transfer B t . Its surplus from staying in the contract is then U ; h t,1 . Agent 1 m a y also decide to renege on the contract after the state of nature has been realized at date t 2 . I n this case its surplus from staying in the contract is uy This de nition states that a contract is self-enforcing for agent 1 if at all times during the relationship agent 1 prefers making the contractual transfer to reneging on the contract and being reduced to autarky from then on. Constraint i is an ex ante self-enforcing constraint in that it holds at date t 0 ; constraint ii is an ex post self-enforcing constraint in that it holds at date t 2 after the state of nature has been realized. It is important to note that even though all ex post self-enforcing constraints are satis ed, the ex ante self-enforcing constraints may not be so. For example, if B t is negative, the ex ante constraint m a y bind while ex post constraints may not once the ex ante payment B t has been paid. It is therefore necessary to consider these two sets of constraints.
When designing the optimal contract the two agents will take i n to account agent 1's incentive to renege. To solve for the optimal contract we m ust therefore add self-enforcing constraints to the maximization problem 1. The optimal contract with non-commitment by agent 1 , 1 , is then the solution to the following maximization problem. 1 The next proposition give s a c haracterization of the optimal contract 1 . 8 Proposition 2 Suppose that the maximum ex ante payment agent 1 can make is B. 9 i For all values of 2 0; 1 the optimal contract with non-commitment by agent 1 is the optimal full-commitment contract, that is, 1 = f c , if and only if B y S , c Sfc , where c sf c is the optimal consumption in state s under the full-commitment contract.
Suppose that B y S , c Sfc . ii There exists a 1 which depends on B such that for 2 1 ; 1, the optimal contract with non-commitment by agent 1 is the optimal full-commitment contract, that is, 1 = f c .
iii For all 2 0; 1 , the following characterization forms part of an optimal contract 1 : , then the optimal full-commitment contract satis es agent 1's self-enforcing constraints. A large enough ex ante payment e ectively allows all ex post transfers a s t to be negative which in turn implies that all ex post self-enforcing constraints are satis ed. 10 Because the optimal full-commitment contract yields agent 1 a surplus in every period its ex ante self-enforcing constraint is also satis ed. 8 All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 9 The bound B is rather arti cial and is introduced solely to study the case in which self-enforcing constraints can be binding. We remove this restriction in the next section. 10 Note that the transfer y S , c Sfc is the largest transfer agent 1 makes to agent 2 in the full-commitment contract fc .
When the maximum ex ante payment agent 1 can make is not high enough, the optimal contract with full-commitment cannot be supported for all values of the discount factor. If the discount factor is high enough, that is, no lower than 1 where 1 is de ned in the Appendix, then agent 1's ex post self-enforcing constraints are not binding. 11 In this case the future bene ts to player 1 of perfect risk-sharing exceed the short-run cost of making the prescribed transfer in any state s. Contrary to the full-commitment case however, the transfer B t is not a matter of indi erence. It will optimally be set to the maximum level agent 1 can pay. F or given net transfers, a maximal ex ante payment reduces ex post transfers a s t from agent 1 to agent 2 and hence the incentive for the former to renege ex post on the contract. It therefore allows the optimal full-commitment contract f c to be supported for the largest interval of discount factors.
When the discount factor is smaller than 1 , the optimal full-commitment contract cannot obtain if B y S , c Sfc . In this case a rst property of an optimal contract is that agent 1 makes the maximum ex ante payment B t = ,B in all periods. 12 A substitution from ex post to ex ante transfers leaves the two agents' consumption unchanged and therefore does not change the value of agent 2's participation constraint, nor the value of ex ante self-enforcing constraints; however it does relax the ex post self-enforcing constraints of agent 1. When one of these constraints is binding this new contract weakly increases the utility of agent 1 . A second property of an optimal contract is that agent 2's expected pro t is nonincreasing in time. The optimal contract seeks two objectives: 1 to insure agent 1 against shocks to its endowment and 2 to smooth its consumption across periods. These objectives are impeded by the inability of agent 1 to commit. They can be improved upon by h a ving agent 1 save" in the early periods and good states of the world and withdraw these savings in later periods and bad states of the world. The optimal contract therefore prescribes using agent 2 a s a s a vings account. This is possible given that agent 2 can commit not to steal" agent 1's early savings. The objective of this savings account is precisely to insure future consumption against bad states of the world. This saving behavior implies that agent 2's expected pro ts are non-increasing in time as it will have to reimburse agent 1's savings in the future.
The following corollary gives a more precise characterization of the optimal consumption path. . In each state, there exists an optimal time-invariant l o w er bound on agent 1's consumption. These bounds are de ned by the ex post self-enforcing constraints and the optimal trade-o between current and future consumption. E cient risk sharing requires agent 1 t o save a large share of its endowment in the better states of the world; however when 1 no consumption can take place below these bounds as such consumption would imply that agent 1 is saving too much compared with the future discounted surplus it expects from the relationship. These bounds are increasing with the state of the world. Agent 1's endowment is optimally shared between current and future consumption. As its endowment increases the lower bound on its current consumption increases as well. These bounds are also decreasing in the maximum ex ante payment that agent 1 can make. An increase in B increases agent 1's cost of reneging on the contract and thus relaxes its ex post self-enforcing constraint. This allows agent 1 to save more and consume less in the current period. This comparative statics result will be useful in the no-commitment case.
Consumption paths follow a simple rule. If, given consumption in period t , 1 optimal consumption smoothing between periods t , 1 and t satis es agent 1's ex post self-enforcing constraints, then consumption in period t is equal to c c t,1 ; y t , 1 ; s . If it does not satisfy agent 1's ex post self-enforcing constraints, then consumption in period t is equal to c s . Consumption then follows a stationary rst-order Markov process where period t consumption depends on period t , 1 consumption and the realized states in periods t , 1 and t. The dynamics of consumption also imply that there is convergence to e cient risk sharing and consumption smoothing. In the steady state consumption only depends on the current state. Moreover, because optimal risk-sharing at actuarially fair prices is impossible when 1 , the steady-state consumption in every state must be higher than optimal consumption in the full-commitment case. This higher consumption is the result of agent 1's savings in the early periods and withdrawals in the later periods. This is acceptable to agent 2 because it gets a compensating surplus at the beginning of the relationship as it consumes agent 1's early savings.
The results of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 are similar to results obtained by Harris and Holmstr om 1982 in a model of labor contracts. They showed that under the assumption of non-commitment b y the employee wages are downward rigid as the risk-neutral employer fully insures the worker against bad states of the world. Our characterization is, rst, a generalization to the case of two risk-averse agents. It shows that, in this case consumption can decrease in some states. Secondly, i t s h o ws that the non-committed party agent 1 w ould like to make in each period ex ante transfers to relax its ex post self-enforcing constraints, that is, an optimal characterization sets B t = ,B.
Having the non-committed agent making the maximal ex ante payment relaxes its ex post self-enforcing constraints. The possibility that the non-committed agent has of making an ex ante payment allows to shift some or all the burden of ex post transfers to the committed agent. However if both agents face self-enforcing constraints the above c haracterization may not be feasible. One agent m a y run away with the ex ante payment of the other agent as its ex post self-enforcing constraints would become too stringent. The optimal ex ante payment should therefore trade o between the two sets of self-enforcing constraints. The next section studies the details of that trade-o when the two agents face self-enforcing constraints.
Contracting under no commitment
We rst de ne the concept of a self-enforcing contract under the non-commitment assumption. This de nition simply states that a contract is self-enforcing if it is self-enforcing for agent 1 constraints i and ii as well as for agent 2 constraints iii and iv.
Before proceeding with the analysis we assume that there are no exogenous bounds on the ex ante payment B t . This assumption is motivated by the fact that we w ant to study how self-enforcing constraints rather than some exogenous bound limit the use of the ex ante payment.
The optimal contract without commitment, nc , is the solution to the following maximization problem. It is di cult to characterize the optimal contract under this formulation. We therefore derive a more manageable recursive formulation. Following any time period and any history the optimal contract nc will necessarily be e cient, since if it were not it would be possible to replace the none cient path by an e cient path thus weakly increasing the utility each agent derives from the contract and hence relaxing all previous self-enforcing constraints. This new contract would necessarily be self-enforcing and would dominate the old contract at the beginning of the relationship. This argument implies that the optimal contract from the start of period t onwards is the solution to the following maximization problem. is to be interpreted as V ; h t,1 ; s , that is, agent 2's expected surplus from period t + 1 o n w ards when contract is signed and s is the realized state of nature in period t. The rst two sets of constraints represent agent 1's ex ante and ex post self-enforcing constraints respectively. The next two sets represent agent 2's self-enforcing constraints. The last constraint of the problem ensures that the contract is dynamically consistent. Before characterizing the properties of the optimal contract we derive some useful technical results.
Lemma 1 i The set of values of V t for which a self-enforcing contract exists is a compact interval 0;
V . ii The Pareto frontier f is decreasing, strictly concave, and continuously di erentiable almost everywhere on 0;
V .
iii For each value of V t 2 0;
V there exists a unique continuation of the contract at time t in which V ; h t,1 = V t and U ; h t,1 = f V t .
T o get a better understanding of the role of the ex ante payment in the no-commitment environment, we will rst state the solution to problem 4 assuming that no ex ante payments are allowed. iv There a r e no values of such that the optimal contract with non-commitment, nc , i s the optimal contract with full commitment, f c .
When no ex ante payments are allowed there are upper and lower bounds on the optimal consumption of agent 1 . L o w er upper bounds are determined by agent 1's 2's ex post selfenforcing constraints and the optimal trade-o between current and future consumptions. Agent 1's consumption follows a simple stationary rst-order Markov process. In period t consumption depends on period t , 1 consumption and endowment and the state of the world realized in period t. This implies that the consumptions of the two agents between two adjacent periods are smoothed as much as possible subject to ex post self-enforcing constraints.
A second important property of this characterization is that the optimal risk-sharing contract, f c , is not feasible under bilateral non-commitment. This contract yields zero expected utility to agent 2 i n e v ery period. Its ex post self-enforcing constraints then hold if and only if a s t 0 for all states s. When B t = 0 these restrictions are incompatible with optimal risk-sharing and hence there is no value of the discount factor for which the contract f c is feasible. 14 We n o w c haracterize the optimal solution when the ex ante payment i s c hosen optimally. An implication of Lemma 1 is that problem 4 is a concave program and therefore rst-order conditions are both necessary and su cient for a solution. If the discount factor is high enough, the optimal full-commitment contract is feasible with non-commitment and is therefore optimal. Agent 2 p a ys up front a high enough payment B t = c 1fc ,y 1 such that the resulting ex post payments, a s t , are all positive. These payments yield zero expected utility to agent 2 i n e v ery period and therefore its ex ante and ex post self-enforcing constraints are all satis ed. If the discount factor is high enough agent 1 prefers to make the ex post payments in all states of nature and be optimally insured in the future rather than keep the up-front p a yment, renege on the contract, and revert to autarky thereafter. The critical value of the discount factor nc de ned formally in the Appendix is the lowest discount factor for which agent 1 does not renege on the contract in all states of nature. This result contrasts with the case B t = 0 where the contract f c is not feasible with non-commitment for any v alue of the discount factor. This is a rst indication that the use of ex ante payments can strictly improve the utility of the two agents at least for some values of the discount factor.
The second result of Lemma 2 states that, when the contract f c is not feasible each agent always has at least one ex post self-enforcing constraint binding. Suppose only one agent w as ex post constrained. This agent could then increase marginally its up-front payment and adjust its ex post payments to maintain its levels of consumption. This would relax its ex post self-enforcing constraints. At the margin, this would not violate the other agent's ex post self-enforcing constraints which w ere not binding before the increase in the ex ante payment. Such c hange would therefore increase the utility of a least one agent. An increase in the ex ante payment b y one agent is possible until one of the other agent's self-enforcing constraint becomes binding, in which case further increases may not be selfenforcing anymore. Therefore, in the optimal contract each agent always has at least one ex post self-enforcing constraint binding.
The next proposition provides a characterization of the optimal ex ante payment when the contract f c is not feasible. The ex ante payment is decreasing in the expected surplus of agent 2 . Suppose that, following a given history the contract promises a low expected surplus to agent 2 . This makes the contract not much more pro table than autarky to agent 2 and thus its ex post self-enforcing constraints are likely to be more constraining than those of agent 1. In this case agent 2 optimally pays out a relatively large ex ante payment to relax its ex post selfenforcing constraints. The size of the optimal ex ante payment is therefore inversely related to the expected surplus of agent 2. This logic can easily be extended to show that the optimal ex ante payment is negative when agent 2 expects a high surplus from the relationship, that is, agent 1 p a ys out to agent 2 a high ex ante transfer.
It is di cult to provide a more complete characterization of the solution in the general case given the number of inequality constraints; however, we can do so in a special case in which there are only two states. This simple example is su cient to illustrate the role of the ex ante payment. We then compare our results with the case in which n o e x a n te payments are allowed. Suppose that S = 2. State 1 can represent a state in which an accident occurs and state 2, a state where no accident occurs. Also assume that the discount factor is such that full insurance at fair prices contract f c is not feasible. If an accident occurs state 1 agent 1 w ants to smooth its impact across periods. It then borrows from agent 2, that is, V 1 t+1 V t . Alternatively agent 1 lends to or reimburses agent 2 if no accident takes place, that is, V 2 t+1 V t . In this case the good news of no accident" is spread over many periods. The second result of the proposition states that the two agents bear more risk than they do in the full-commitment case. This shows that incomplete insurance need not be explained by the presence of asymmetric information. Non-commitment problems can also explain such occurrence.
These results may seem quite similar to those one would obtain when no ex ante payments are allowed. This may be a misleading conclusion. Consider rst the case where no ex ante payments are allowed. The results of Proposition 3 imply that optimal consumption takes place at c 1 c 2 if state 1 2 occurs. These consumption levels are time-invariant and therefore consumption can only take one of these two v alues depending on the realized state. At a n y given period expected consumption for next period is the same regardless of the history. Now consider the case where ex ante payments are allowed. In any given period, for a given value B of the ex ante payment it is possible to de ne as in Proposition 3 consumption bounds c 1 B and c 2 B. We know that these optimal bounds are increasing with the ex ante payment. 15 Furthermore Proposition 5 states that V 2 t+1 V t V 1 t+1 . Using Proposition 4 this implies that the ex ante payment from agent 2 to agent 1 will decrease increase in period t + 1 compared to that of period t if state 1 2 occurs. We can now characterize the optimal consumption paths. Suppose state 1 occurs in period t. Agent 2 i s then promised a higher expected surplus for period t + 1. This implies that it will make a lower ex ante payment in period t + 1 t h us reducing the two consumption bounds for that period. Expected consumption will then be lower in period t + 1 than in period t. The opposite holds if state 2 occurs in period t, that is, expected consumption rises in period
In an insurance context these results can be interpreted as the insurance premium increasing when an accident occurs and decreasing when no accident occurs. Furthermore the dynamics of our model imply that the complete history is relevant for explaining contemporaneous insurance premium, that is, a sequence of accidents results in successive increases in insurance premia and therefore a drop in expected consumption. The consumption pattern with an ex ante payment looks like experience rating", that is, average consumption in one period is positively related to the previous realizations of the state of nature. In this model experience rating arises from the desire of the insuree to smooth consumption over time. This is optimally achieved by h a ving a premium increase when an accident occurs. In this case, the current marginal utility of the insuree is high and it promises higher premia in the future in exchange for a high current compensation. Our model therefore predicts that experience rating can take place in an insurance market even though information is symmetric and shocks are identically and independently distributed. Our model can therefore generate higher order correlation in consumption even though endowments are independently distributed. This shows that neither asymmetric information nor uncertainty and learning are necessary to explain experience rating in dynamic insurance contracts. This simple example shows that allowing for an ex ante payment yields predictions that are signi cantly di erent from those without ex ante payments.
Discussion
In this section we discuss two possible modi cations to our economic environment, namely the introduction of savings and bonding.
One question that comes to mind is: would the contract still have v alue if, say agent 1 w as allowed to save at a risk-free rate equal to its discount rate? The introduction of savings in the contracting framework developed here would have nontrivial e ects on the patterns of consumption. Savings does not only modify the expected utility an agent gets from the contract but also its expected utility in autarky. A s s a vings accumulate autarky becomes more attractive; but this does not imply that the contract may e v entually play no role. Bewley 1977 and Schechtman 1976 show that even though an agent has accumulated important s a vings, still it does not fully insure itself against random shocks. Rather, good shocks are spread over many periods, as are bad shocks in an e ort to smooth consumption. There is therefore some residual risk left in an agent's consumption. It is then presumed that some residual risk could be further insured by a self-enforcing contract with, for example a risk-neutral agent. Autarcic consumption would then correspond to consumption with savings instead of consumption of the endowment. In any case the contract would be useful in the early periods where a bad shock increases the demand for a loan. The introduction of savings is worth investigating and is the subject of our current research.
Another interesting question that often comes to mind in non-commitment e n vironments is: what if agents could post a bond? It is well known that posting a bond is a means for avoiding self-enforcing constraints, that is, the agent that cannot commit or that must be disciplined simply posts a bond that it loses if it does not perform satisfactorily. F or example Williamson 1983 illustrates how the use of a bond can promote e cient trade. Posting a bond is equivalent to specifying a penalty for breach o f c o n tract. We can then provide a di erent i n terpretation for the ex ante payment. Suppose that all payments and consumption take place at the end of the period. The ex ante payment can now b e i n terpreted as a penalty for breach o f c o n tract that is decided upon by the agents at the beginning of the period, that is paid only in case of default, and that is enforceable by the courts. Our results would therefore imply that the net penalty rests upon the shoulders of that agent that is the most likely to breach the contract, that is, the agent that expects the lower future surplus from the relationship.
Because B t is the net penalty, this interpretation would imply that it cannot be made contingent on who breached the contract. This would be reasonable in an environment where the courts can observe whether a relationship is continuing or not, but if it is not they cannot determine why there has been a breach. This is a reasonable assumption if, for example, an agent can force" the other agent to breach the contract by misbehaving. If courts can observe who breached the contract then an agent-speci c bond would resolve all commitment problems.
One can argue that bonds could also be posted with third parties that would keep it if an agent e v er breaches the contract. This solution also has some problems of its own. For one, it may encourage collusion between one of the agents and the third party to breach the contract and then share the bond. Or, faced with a possible breach the agents may renegotiate the contract to avoid losing the bond to the third party.
Conclusion
We develop a dynamic model of contracting for risk-sharing purposes. Complete insurance is impeded by ex post opportunism in that agents can break the relationship at any time if it is in their own interest to do so. However, agents can commit partially by making payments at the beginning of a period before the state of nature is realized. These payments can increase the potential gains from trade but cannot generally restore perfect risk sharing. These payments evolve i n v ersely with the surplus an agent expects from the relationship. The critical value 1 above which all ex post self-enforcing constraints are satis ed is given by For values of outside this interval, at least one of the ex post self-enforcing constraints for agent 1 is violated and thus the optimal full-commitment contract is not feasible when agent 1 can renege on the contract. iii The proof of this part of the proposition is more involved and we need to introduce some notation. De ne by h t , 1 the set of contracts satisfying the self-enforcing constraints for agent 1 following history h t,1 . F or convenience we de ne this set over the space of functions C t and B t . This set is not convex due to the presence of the term ,uy s t + B t in the self-enforcing constraints of agent 1. Because it is convenient t o w ork with a convex set we convexify this set by allowing for lotteries over the xed payment B t . 16 The Pareto frontier is time-independent as all constraints de ning b h t,1 and the functions U; h t,1 and V ; h t,1 are forward looking.
We n o w show that the Pareto frontier is strictly concave and continuously di erentiable almost everywhere. 17 First we argue that the set b h t,1 is convex. This follows directly form the concavity of the utility function u and linearity of the constraints in the terms Z t ; h t,1 .
Secondly, following history h t,1 , the set of V t such that a self-enforcing contract for agent 1 exists is a compact interval ,K 1 ; V where ,K 1 is the discounted utility of agent 2 when it pays out to agent 1 its total endowment i n e v ery state and period. 18 Such transfers are obviously self-enforcing for agent 1. There exists an upper bound on the surplus agent 1 can concede to agent 2 in a selfenforcing contract. Denote this upper bound by V . I f V is attainable by a self-enforcing contract, then any V t 2 ,K 1 ;
V is also. The closedness of this interval can be shown by constructing a sequence of self-enforcing contracts yielding some utility level to agent 2 converging to V . Because u is continuous and 2 0; 1, the Dominated Convergence Theorem implies that the limiting contract is also self-enforcing and hence V is included in the interval. Finally, w e show that the Pareto frontier is decreasing, strictly concave and continuously di erentiable almost everywhere. It is obvious that the function g is decreasing. The strict concavity property follows from the strict concavity o f u , the concavity o f v , and the convexity o f b . The di erentiability property follows from the continuity and di erentiability o f u . Consider an e cient self-enforcing contract such that V ; h t,1 = V t 2 , K 1 ; V . Construct a contract which differs from the contract in that a h t,1 ; s = a h t , 1 ; s + . The state s is chosen such that agent 1's ex post self-enforcing constraint is not strictly binding. The contract is therefore self-enforcing for small enough. De ne the functionĝ such that U ; h t,1 = g V ; h t , 1 gV ; h t,1 with equality i f = 0 . A s is varied, it is easy to show that the functionĝ is concave and differentiable at V t . Therefore it satis es Lemma 1 reported in Benveniste and Scheinkman 1979. The function g is then di erentiable. Because it is monotonic, it is also continuously di erentiable almost everywhere. This implies that for any v alue V t 2 ,K 1 ; V , there exists a unique e cient continuation of the contract at time t in which V ; h t,1 = V t and U ; h t,1 = g V t . Existence is guaranteed by the compactness of the interval ,K 1 ; V ; uniqueness is guaranteed by the convexity o f b and the strict concavity o f u .
This Pareto frontier can be used to characterize the optimal contract. Following any history the optimal contract 1 will necessarily be e cient, since if it were not it would be possible to replace the none cient path by an e cient path thus relaxing all previous self-enforcing constraints. This new contract would necessarily be self-enforcing and would dominate the old contract at the beginning of the relationship. This argument implies that the optimal contract from the start of period t onwards is the solution to the following maximization problem. and the envelope condition is g 0 V t = , .
1. If no self-enforcing constraint binds s = 0 for all s, only net payments matter and hence z t B can be set arbitrarily such that it has a mass point a t B and be zero elsewhere. Note that this density is the one for which ex post self-enforcing constraints are the least binding. The rst equation follows from rst-order conditions to problem 8 and the fact that s = 0 for all s while the second represents agent 1's ex post self-enforcing constraint in state s. Note that these equations are time-independent. After substituting for V s in agent 1's ex post self-enforcing constraint, the optimal bound on consumption, c s , is then implicitly de ned by The left-hand side of the ex post self-enforcing constraint is increasing in c s which implies that it is satis ed for c s t c s for all t and s.
ii Totally di erentiating equations 12 and 13 with respect to c s , V s , and y s yields dc s =dy s 0. 19 Hence, c s is increasing in the states of the world, that is, c k c q if and only if y k y q . Finally, totally di erentiating the same equations yields dc s =dB 0:
iii From the rst-order conditions in periods t , 1 The set of self-enforcing contracts b h t,1 is then fC t ; Z t ; h t,1 such that both agents' selfenforcing constraints are satis edg. 19 Because the function g is continuously di erentiable almost everywhere and concave w e know that g 00 exists almost everywhere. Where it does not exist, we know that the right-hand and left-hand derivatives are negative, which is su cient t o p r o v e the result. Now consider the following modi ed version of problem 4 where we allow for random values of B. It will be used to show that the optimal Z t ; h t,1 is degenerate at a single value. 
